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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN NORTH DAKOTA'S
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT: AN EXERCISE IN
FUTILITY?
THOMAS A. DICKSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979 North Dakota adopted its Products Liability Act.1
This legislation was enacted in response to a perceived crisis with
products liability insurance rates. 2 The act was a legislative attempt
to limit products liability actions3 and was the culmination of
several years of study by the North Dakota Legislature. 4
In 1977 the State Legislature passed a concurrent resolution
directing the Legislative Council to conduct a study on the
availability and affordability of products liability insurance.5 The
*Thomas A. Dickson, B.A. Monterey Institute of Foreign Studies, Monterey, California, 1976;
.J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1981; member of the North Dakota Bar; currently associated
with the law firm ofZuger & Bucklin, Bismarck, North Dakota.
The author would like to thank CynthiaJ. Norland for her assistance.
1. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-01.1 (Supp. 1981 & Interim Supp. 1983). The 1983 Legislative
Assembly amended § 28-01.1-02 by making an exception for asbestos litigation. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01.1-02(4) (Interim Supp. 1983). The questionable constitutionality of this amendment will not
be discussed in this Article.
2. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-01 (Supp. 1981) (entitled "Declaration of Legislative
Findings and Intent").
3. See id. A products liability action is "a civil action against a manufacturer or dealer of any
product brought for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death, or property damage
sustained by reason of a defect in the product." N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, BACKGROUND
MEMORANDUM ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE COMMITTEE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 1979 LEG., at 1
(1977) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM].
4. See Kraft, The North Dakota Equity for Tortfeasors Struggle - Judicial Action v. Legislative Over-
Reaction, 56 N.D.L. REV. 67, 99-111 (1980) (an indepth recitation of the legislative path to
enactment of the North Dakota Products Liability Act).
5. N.D. S. Con. Res. 4030, 45th Leg., 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws 1552.
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purpose of the study was to ascertain why manufacturers had
difficulty procuring products liability insurance. 6  The study
directed the Legislative Council to recommend any necessary
legislation to the 1979 Legislative Assembly. 7 In its initial
memorandum opinion, the Legislative Council's staff accepted the
idea propagated by manufacturers, that products liability litigation
was the primary cause of the manufacturer's problem in procuring
products liability insurance. 8 The Legislative Council's report
relied heavily upon the findings of the Federal Interagency Task
Force on Products Liability. 9 This task force was established by the
White House Economic Policy Board in 1976 to study products
liability. 10 The Task Force's final report listed three major causes of
increased products liability insurance rates: (1) liability insurance
ratemaking procedures; (2) the tort-litigation system; and (3)
manufacturing policies. 1 The tort-litigation system was only one of
three substantial reasons for increased products liability insurance
premiums, but it was the one problem singled out to receive the
most legislative attention throughout the country. 12
Upon completion of its initial memorandum opinion, the
Legislative Council assigned the project to an Interim Committee
on Products Liabiltiy for further study.13 This Committee
conducted hearings and gathered information in search of a
6. See BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 1.
7. N.D. S. Con. Res. 4030, 45th Leg., 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws 1552.
8. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM; supra note 3, at 3. Although the Legislative Council cited three
reasons for the problem of increased products liability insurance rates, the memorandum dealt
almost exclusively with the tort-litigation systems. Id.
9. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 2. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, BRIEFING REPORT 3 (1977).
10. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 3. The Task Force was comprised of
representatives from the Department of Commerce; the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare; the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Department of Labor; the
Department of Transportation; the Treasury Department; the Council of Economic Advisors; the
Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; and the
Small Business Administration. Id.
11. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 11. In addition, the Task Force noted that other
causes may contribute to the problem. Inflation, consumer awareness, the increase in the number
and complexity of products, and product misuse all have a measurable effect on products liability
insurance rates. Id.
12. The following state statutes of limitation deal specifically with products liability actions:
ALA. CODE 9 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-
2803 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-127.5, -127.6 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-577a (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95-031 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-50 to
-53 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303, -3304,
-3306 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 541.05, 604.03 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (Supp. 1981); N. H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1 (Interim Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.905 (1981); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (Supp. 1982); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp. 1983).
13. See NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE FORTY-SIXTH LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY, at 137 (1979).
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solution to the perceived products liability crisis in North Dakota.
The Committee completed its study in November 1978 and
submitted its recommendations in a report to the Legislative
Council. 14  The Committee recommended two bills to the
Legislative Council.15 The Legislative Council accepted the
Committee's report and voted to recommend the passage of these
two bills to the Forty-Sixth Legislative Assembly convening in
January 1979.16 These bills were subsequently enacted into law as
North Dakota's Products Liability Act. 17 One provision in the new
Act was its unique statute of limitations.
This Article initially examines the substantive and procedural
effects of this new statute of limitations. This Article will also
review the statute in light of state constitutional considerations to
determine whether it impermissibly infringes upon constitutionally
protected rights.
II. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE § 28-01.1-02 IS NOT
A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The previous statute of limitations in products liability actions
required that actions be commenced within six years after the cause
of action accrued. 18 In a products liability action the cause of action
usually accrues at the time of the injury.' 9 Thus, an action had to
be brought within six years of the date of injury. The new statute of
limitations, section 28-01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code, 20 retains the original six-year limitation, but with an
additional twist in certain cases.
Section 28-01.1-02 prohibits certain products liability actions
unless the injury occurs within ten years of the date of the initial
purchase or within eleven years of the date the product was
manufactured. 21 It is apparent that this statute will be applied in
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The two bills considered by the North Dakota Legislative Assembly in 1979 were House
Bills 1075 and 1589. Id. See N.D. H.R. 1075, 1589, 46th Leg., 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 892-96.
17. N.D. H.R. 1075, 1589, 46th Leg., 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 892-96, codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 28-01.1 (Supp. 1981). This legislation was passed over Governor Link's veto. See Kraft,
supra note 4, at 100 n. 117. The insurance lobby supported enactment of the Products Liability Act.
Id. at 100.
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16 (1974). Section 28-01-16 states in part: "The following actions
must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued: 1. An action upon a
contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, subject to the provisions of sections 28-01-15
and 41-02-104 .... "Id.
19. See Keller v. Clark Equipment Co., 474 F. Supp. 966, 969 (D.N.D. 1979). Until an injury
has occurred, a defendant has not breached a statutory or legal duty owed to the plaintiff. Id.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Interim Supp. 1983).
21. Id. Section 28-01.1-02 provides:
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conjunction with the original six year limitation. 22  Thus,
application of this statute to products liability actions will require a
two-tier analysis: (1) the injury must occur within a ten or eleven
year time period; and (2) the action must be brought within six
years of the injury. 23
In essence this statute purports to establish an absolute time
after the purchase or manufacture of the product beyond which no
action can be maintained. The statute could bar the right of an
injured person to seek redress of an injury before that right arose.
The effect of section 28-01.1-02 is to absolutely extinguish the right
of a person injured by certain older products to assert his personal
injury claim in court. It is this absolute bar of certain claims that
distinguishes this statute from traditional statutes of limitations. 24
1. There shall be no recovery of damages for personal injury, death, or damage to
property caused by a defective product, except as provided in subsection 4, unless the
injury, death, or damage occurred within ten years of the date of initial purchase for
use or consumption, or within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product,
where that action is based upon, or arises out of, any of the following:
a. Breach of any implied warranties.
b. Defects in design, inspection, testing or manufacture.
c. Failure to warn.
d. Failure to properly instruct in the use of a product.
2. The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or
other legal disability, but shall not apply to any cause of action where the personal
injury, death, or damage to property occurs within two years afterJuly 1, 1979.
3. If a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer issues a recall of a product in any state,
modifies a product, or becomes aware of any defect in a product at any time, and fails
to notify or warn a user of the product who is subsequently injured or damaged as a
result of the defect, the provisions of subsection I shall not bar any action against the
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer based upon, or arising out of, the defect.
4. Any action to recover damages based on injury allegedly resulting from exposure to
asbestos composed of chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, tremolite anthrophyllite,
actinolite, or any combination thereof, shall be commenced within three years after
the injured person has been informed of discovery of the injury by competent medical
authority and that such injury was caused by exposure to asbestos as described herein,
or within three years after the discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such
discovery, whichever is earlier. No action commenced under this subsection based on
the doctrine of strict liability in tort shall be commenced or maintained against any
seller of a product which is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless such seller is also the
manufacturer of such product or the manufacturer of the part thereof claimed to be
defective. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to permit an action to be
brought based on an injury described in this subsection discovered more than two
years prior toJuly 1, 1983.
Id.
22. The statutory language of § 28-01.1-02 merely states that an action will be barred if the
injury does not occur within the ten or eleven year time period. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02. It is
thus apparent that if an injury occurs within the ten or eleven year time period, the action must then
be brought within the six year time limitation set out in § 28-01-16. See id. § 28-01-16.
23. Section 28-01.1-02 applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability. Id.
528-01.1-02(2).
The traditional rule codified at § 28-01-25 tolls the applicable statute of limitations for the
duration of a person's disability. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (Interim Supp. 1983).
24. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Products Liability Statute of Repose, 30
AM. U.L. REv. 579 (1981) (a discussion of the critical differences between a traditional statute of
limitations and a statute of repose).
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The United States Supreme Court recognized the
constitutional right of state legislatures to enact statutes of
limitation in Wilson v. Iseminger.25 The Court discussed a statute of
limitation as follows:
[A]ll statutes of limitation.., proceed on the idea that the
party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in
the courts. A statute could not bar the existing rights of
claimants without affording this opportunity; if it should
attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of limitations,
but [rather] an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights
arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its
provisions. 26
Inherent in the word "limitation" is the idea that one's
prepossessed rights are limited under certain defined conditions. 27
To call section 28-01.2-02 a statute of limitations is a misnomer.
The statute does not limit the rights of a person injured by an older
product; it absolutely extinguishes them.
The time period in section 28-01.1-02 begins to run from the
date of sale or manufacture, rather than from the traditional date of
injury. 28 This characteristic is indicative of newly enacted statutes
of limitation for products liability actions. 29 These statutes are
variously referred to as "statutes of limitation,'' 3  "date of sale
statutes of limitation," '3 1 or "statutes of repose." ' 32 The term
"statutes of repose" most properly defines the legal effect of these
statutes.
A statute of repose begins to run from a time unrelated to
traditional statutes of limitation. 33 In products liability actions, the
25. 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902).
26. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902).
27. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 835 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (defines limitation as a "[r]estriction or
circumspection;... [a] certain time allowed by a statute for... litigation").
28. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(1). North Dakota Century Code § 28-01.1-02 was based
on §§ 78-15-f to -6 of the Utah Code. N.D. Leg. Council, Minutes of Meeting of Interim
Committee on Products Liability 13 (Oct. 10-11, 1977) (available on microfiche). See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Interim Supp. 1983); UTA-H CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-1 to -6 (1977). For a discussion
of the Utah law, see generally Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolution
of Competing Concerns, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 149.
29. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Product Liability - The Searchfor Solutions, NATION's Bus.,June
1977, at 30. See supra note 12 for a list of states that have enacted statutes of limitation for products
liability actions. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations,
56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 665 (1978) (discusses the weaknesses of statutes of repose enacted on a state by
state basis).
30. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02.
31. See Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation - A New Immunityfor Product Suppliers, INS. LJ.,
Sept. 1977, at 536.
32. See McGovern, supra note 24, at 579-80.
33. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Interim Supp. 1983) (statute of repose running
1983]
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statute of repose generally runs from the date of sale or
manufacture. 34 The traditional statute of limitations usually runs
from the time the cause of action accrues. 35 The cause of action
customarily accrues at the time of injury. 36 Thus, the traditional
statute of limitations serves as a procedural limitation on an injured
person's right to seek judicial redress. 7
Statutes of repose, however, constitute more than just
procedural limitations. 38 They serve as a complete substantive bar
to a plaintiff's personal injury actions under certain conditions. 39
These statutes, however, potentially have both a substantive and
procedural effect on an injured person's claim. If the injury occurs
subsequent to the statutory time period, the statute acquires its
substantive quality by completely barring the injured person's
claim. 40 If the injury occurs within the statutory time period,
however, the statute operates in conjunction with the traditional
statute of limitation as a procedural limitation. 41
Historically, statutes of limitation prevented plaintiffs from
sleeping on their legal rights to the detriment of defendants. 42 The
focus in the traditional statutes was upon the conduct of the
from date of manufacture or sale) with N.D. CENT. CODF S 28-01-16 (Supp. 1981) (statute of
limitation running from date the action accrues).
34. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). Section 78-15-3(1) provides that no action may be
brought for the recovery of damages more than six years after the date of the initial purchase for use
or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture. Id.
35. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-16.
36. Wittrock v. Weisz, 73 N.W.2d 355, 360 (N.D. 1955). The Wittrock court stated, "It is the
essence of the statute of limitations that time begins to run under them as to causes of action only
after the right to prosecute them to a successful conclusion has fully accrued." Id.
37. State v. Halverson, 69 N.D. 225, 226, 285 N.W. 292, 293 (1939). The Halverson court stated
that the purpose of a statute of limitations is to prevent the enforcement of stale demands. Id.
38. Several states have recognized the substantive nature ofthese statutes. See, e.g., Kline v.J. I.
Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564, 566-67 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (a state legislature may extinguish a cause of
action before it accrues if the state action is not arbitrary or lacking any rational connection to a
legitimate state interest) (1979); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 367, 293 S.E.2d
415, 418 (1982) (statutes of repose are intended to be a substantive definition of rights as
distinguished from a procedural limitation).
39. See Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 669, -, 284 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ct.
App. 1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 367, 293 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1982). The North Carolina Courtof
Appeals in Bolick stated:
Because [the statute] attempts to bar absolutely claims arising out of defects or failures
in relation to products after a period measured from a date other than the date of
accrual of those claims, it does not constitute a statute of limitation. Rather, it would,
as a matter of substantive law, abolish certain claims recognized prior to its
enactment.
54 N.C. App. at-., 284 S.E.2d at 192.
40. See Proposed Adoption of the North Dakota Products Liability Act: Hearings on H. 1075 Before the
House Comm. on Industry, Business andLabor, 46th Leg. (1979) (testimony ofJohn Morrison of the N.D.
Legislative Council).
41. Id.
42. See State v. Halverson, 69 N.D. 225, 226, 285 N.W. 292, 293 (1939). The Halverson court
held that a statute requiring the Workmen's Compensation Bureau to bring suit within 20 days after
default by the employer was not a statute of limitations and thus did not create a condition precedent
to the maintenance of an action by the Bureau. Id.
556 [VOL. 59:551
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plaintiff.43 If the plaintiff did not bring his cause of action in a
timely manner, the statute of limitations deprived him of the
opportunity to seek judicial redress for an otherwise valid claim. 44
Statutes of repose, however, focus on the age of a product rather
than on the plaintiffs conduct. They absolutely bar all claims when
products exceed the statutory age limitation and completely deprive
a plaintiff of his rights merely because he has been injured by an
older product. 45
The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is the
essence of the statute of limitations that time begins to run ... only
after the right to prosecute [the cause of action] has fully
accrued. "46 According to this definition, section 28-01.1-02 cannot
properly be considered a statute of limitations.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 28-01.1-02
North Dakota Century Code section 28-01.1-02 arguably
violates several North Dakota constitutional provisions: article I,
section 9, the open court provision; 47 article I, section 12, the due
process clause; 48 article I, section 21, the privileges and immunities
clause; 49 article I, section 22, the equal protection clause; 50 and
43. Statutes of limitation have long been a part of English common law. The first statute of
limitations relating to personal actions was passed in 1623. W. FERGUSON, THIE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS SAVING STATUTES 9 (1978).
44. State v. Halverson, 69 N.D. at 226, 285 N.W. at 293.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment g (1979). Comment g notes that
statutes of repose may raise constitutional problems.
46. Wittrock v. Weisz, 73 N.W.2d 355, 360 (N.D. 1955).
47. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. Section 9, referred to as North Dakota's open court provision,
provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in
such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by
law, direct.
Id.
48. Id. art. I, 5 12. Section 12 provides: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." Id.
49. Id. art. I, 5 21. Section 21 provides: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be
granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any
citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be
granted to all citizens." Id.
50. Id. art. I, 5 22. Section 22 states that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation." Id. Sections 21 and 22 of article I of the North Dakota Constitution have been
interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court to guarantee equal protection under the state
constitution. See Vermont Loan & Trust Co. v. Withed, 2 N.D. 82, 93-94, 49 N.W. 318, 320 (1891)
(benefits or burdens of a statute must fall equally on all members of class that it affects).
Amendment 14, 5 I of the United States Constitution guarantees equal protection under the
federal constitution. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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article VI, section 3, which grants the North Dakota Supreme
Court the authority to promulgate rules of procedure.5 1 This
Article next examines the possible infringement of section 28-01.1
-02 on each of these constitutional provisions.
A. THE OPEN COURT PROVISION
Article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution
guarantees that every man will have a remedy by due process of law
for any injury that is done to him. 52 This constitutional provision
stands for the proposition that all potential litigants are guaranteed
free access to the courts of North Dakota. 53 Before determining
whether section 28-01.1-02 violates article I, section 9, one must
initially ascertain the appropriate standard of review.
The open court provision has remained a neglected part of the
North Dakota Constitution. For one reason or another, the courts
have overlooked its constitutional guaranty of free access to our
courts for potential litigants. In the only recent opinion in which it
interpreted this provision, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that the public is entitled to free access to judicial proceedings.54
The court, however, did not discuss which standard of review
it would apply in determining whether this constitutional right has
been infringed. Therefore, the determination of the appropriate
standard of review must depend upon analogous interpretations of
other state constitutional provisions and upon case law from other
jurisdictions.
North Dakota constitutional analysis provides for three
51. N.D. CONST. art. VI, 5 3. Section 3 provides: "The supreme court shall have authority to
promulgate rules of procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all the courts of the
state; ... Id.
52. Id. art. I, § 9. Sixteen other states have a constitutional provision that is similar to § 9. See
ALA. CONST. art. I, 9 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL. CONSr. art. I,§ 9; IND. CoNsr. art. I, 5 12;
Ky. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 6; MIss. CONsT. art. III, § 24; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 13; OHIo
CoNST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONsr. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, 5 20; TENN. CONsr. art. I, 5 17;
TEx. CONST. art. I, 5 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, 9 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; WYo. CONsT. art.
I, §8.
53. See Malin v. LaMoure County, 27 N.D. 140, 146, 145 N.W. 582, 586 (1914). In Malin the
North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted the open court provision as prohibiting unreasonable
restraints upon the use of the courts. Id. See also Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 45 N.D. 568,
570, 178 N.W. 792, 794 (1920) (for a wrong perpetrated upon a person's reputation, he may recover
his damages).
54. KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 511 (N.D. 1980). In KFGO Radio the North
Dakota Supreme Court was more concerned with reiterating the constitutional right of public
judicial proceedings than it was with defining the parameters of potential litigants' access to North
Dakota courts. See id. See also Nelson Paving Co. v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1973). In Nelson
Paving Co. the North Dakota Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appellant's constitutional claim
without any substantive discussion of North Dakota's open court provision. See id. at 234. The court
stated that "the arbitration hearing was authorized by the Legislature through that statute and is not
in violation offNorth Dakota's open court provision]". Id.
[VOL. 59:551
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different standards of review.5 5 The most restrictive is the "strict
scrutiny" test. 56 If a statute distinguishes based upon a suspect
classification5 7 or if it infringes upon a fundamental interest, 58 the
court will review the statute using the strict scrutiny standard. A
statute must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest to survive a constitutional attack under the strict scrutiny
standard. 59 A statute has little chance of being found constitutional
if the strict scrutiny standard is applied.
North Dakota recently has recognized a second or middle level
of review. This is the "close correspondence" test. 60 Under the
close correspondence test the court requires a close correspondence
between the statutory classification and its legislative goals. 61
Although this is a less restrictive review, the court will nevertheless
independently examine the basis of the legislative justification for
the statute in question. 62
The third and most lenient standard of review is the "rational
relationship" test. 63 Under the rational relationship test the court
must find that the statute is rationally related to some legitimate
governmental end. 64 In addition, the government's actions cannot
55. SeeJohnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974) (discusses the three standards of
review as applied to an automobile guest statute).
56. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (strict scrutiny test is the most
stringent standard ofreview).
57. A suspect classification includes those classifications based upon some "immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973).
58. A fundamental interest is an inherent right jealously protected by the safeguards of the
Constitution. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). In Shapiro the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute mandating a one year waiting period before new applicants could receive
welfare benefits. Id. The Court held that the statute placed an unfair burden on the fundamental
right to interstate travel. Id.
59. State ex rel. Olsen v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627 (N.D. 1977). In cases where strict
judicial scrutiny is applied, classifications created by statute will be held invalid unless the statute
promotes a compelling state interest and the classification is necessary to further that interest. Id.
(citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
60. The close correspondence test differs somewhat from the middle level ofreview employed by
the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court views the middle level of
review as the "fair and substantial relationship" test. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Under the fair and substantial relationship standard, the statute must bear a fair and substantial
relation to important governmental objectives. Id. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(Illinois statutory classification based on legitimacy violative of fourteenth amendment). The Trimble
Court stated that the Illinois intestate succession statute was not "carefully tuned to alternative
considerations." Id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)). See also Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (Social Security Act classification based on legitimacy not violative of
equal protection clause). The Mathews Court stated that the appellees had the burden of
demonstrating the "insubstantiality between legislative means and objectives." Id. at 510.
61. SeeJohnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d at 775.
62. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W. 2d at 133. Applying the close correspondence test, the
Arneson court independently examined the basis of the legislation and determined that there was not a
sufficiently close correspondence between the statutory classification and the legislative goals. Id. at
135.
63. See State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1,6 (N.D. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 924 (1982). The court
in Goetz found questioned provisions to be "rationally related to the legitimate government objective
of protecting investors in securities." Id.
64. Id.
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be arbitrary or patently unreasonable. 65 Most statutes survive a
constitutional attack under this standard of review.
The determination of the appropriate standard of review
depends upon the interest invaded or the statutory classification.
66
In Lankford v. Sullivan, Long, and Hagerty,67 the Alabama Supreme
Court reviewed a products liability statute of limitations under
Alabama's open court provision. 68 Alabama's open court provision
is virtually identical to article I, section 9 of the North Dakota
Constitution. 69 The court utilized an extremely restrictive standard
of review and held that Alabama's products liability statute of'
limitations was unconstitutional. 7 The court stated that
"[1]egislation which abolishes or alters a common-law cause of
action, then, or its enforcement through legal process, is
automatically suspect .... ",71 Should the North Dakota Supreme
Court adopt this reasoning, section 28-01.1-02 undoubtedly would
be declared unconstitutional.
The key question in determining whether this legislation is
suspect is whether common law rights have been altered or
abolished. 72 If common law rights have been altered or abolished,
such legislation should be subjected to the most stringent review. 73
If no common law rights have been affected, the legislation should
be accorded more judicial deference. 74 Although the Alabama
Supreme Court discussed at length the appropriate standard of
review in Lankford, the court would have found the statute
unconstitutional by employing either the stringent or the more
65. See Hospital Servs., Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69, 72 (N.D. 1975) (state cannot create a
class of "responsible relatives" to reduce the financial burden of the state for the care of those who
have been involuntarily committed to a hospital for the mentally ill).
66. See State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1980) (utilization of a more stringent
standard ofreview required when a defendant is subject to criminal prosecution).
67. 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
68. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long, & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 998 (Ala. 1982). The Alabama
open court provision is at article I, 5 13 of the Alabama Constitution.
69. Compare ALA. CoNsr. art. I, § 13 ("That all courts shall be open; and that every person, for
any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due process of
law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.") with N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 9 ("All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner, in such courts,
and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct.").
70. Lankford, 416 So.2d at 1004.
71. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added). The Alabama court noted, however, that declaring a statute
immediately suspect would not automatically make it invalid. Id. Such legislation could still survive
constitutional scrutiny if the right was voluntarily relinquished by its possessor in exchange for
equivalent benefits or protection or if the legislation eradicated or ameliorated some perceived social
evil and was thus a proper extension of police power. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Although the court's review would be more deferential when no common law rights are
affected, the legislation may not be arbitrary or capricious. See State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d at 7.
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deferential standard of review. 75
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a products
liability statute of repose7 6 denies access to the courts in violation of
Florida's open court provision. 77 In a per curiam opinion the
Florida Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional based
upon an earlier decision that defined the constitutional parameters
of Florida's open court provision. 78 In the earlier decision, Overland
Construction Co. v. Sirmons,79 the Florida court employed a two-tiered
analysis to an alleged infringement upon Florida's open court
provision.80 The statute in question was a statute of repose that
extinguished all causes of action against architects for injuries
occurring more than twelve years after completion of the
construction."1
First, the court determined whether the legislature, without
providing any reasonable alternative, abolished a statutory or
common law right of action protected by Florida's open court
provision.8 2 Second, the court determined whether the legislature
had shown an overpowering public necessity for this prohibitory
75. Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1003. The court in Lankford determined that the Alabama open court
provision was arbitrary on its face and stated that it could not be upheld against a constitutional
attack. Id. at 1004. The Alabama court held that there must be a substantial relationship between
the legislation and the eradication of a social evil. Id. at 1001. It is interesting to note that although
the Alabama court found the legislation to be suspect, they apparently employed a middle level
standard of review. See id.
76. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031 (West 1982) (action must be commenced within 12 years of the
date of sale).
77. Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam). See FLA.
CONST. art. I, 9 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.").
78. 392 So. 2d at 874 (relying on Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979)).
79. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
80. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1979). In Overland, the Florida
Supreme Court held that a statute which provided that an action founded on the design, planning or
construction of an improvement to realty must be brought against the professional engineer,
registered architect or licensed contractor within 12 years after completion of the improvement
violated Florida's constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. (analyzing FLA. STAT. 5 95.11(3)(c)
(1975)).
See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). The Florida Supreme Court in Kluger stated that:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been
provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of the
common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. S 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is
without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to
protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the
Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such
right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
Id. at4.
81. 369 So. 2d at 574.
82. Id. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (West 1982). Section 2.01 provides that "the common and
statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature ... down to the 4th day ofJuly,
1776 are declared to be in force in this state .... " Id. These common law principles have not been
confined as of 1776, however, but have been "designed for application to new conditions and
circumstances." State ex re. Burr v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 744, 106 So. 576, 584
(1925).
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provision and the absence of less onerous alternatives. 83 Using this
analysis, the Florida court initially determined that the legislature
had abolished a constitutionally protected cause of action without
providing any reasonable alternative. 84 The court then moved to
the second phase of its analysis and held that the legislature had
shown neither an overpowering public necessity for the statute of
repose nor the absence of less onerous alternatives.8 5 In its final
analysis, the Florida Supreme Court held that it would be
constitutionally impermissible to apply a statute of repose to
destroy a cause of action before it legally exists. 8 6
Interestingly, the Florida court determined that the rights
protected "by our constitutional guarantee of a right of access to
courts make it irrelevant that this 'statute of repose' may be valid
under state or federal due process or equal protection clauses. "87
Thus, the Florida court recognized that the rights protected by
Florida's open court provision are unique to that provision and,
therefore, need not be controlled by analysis under the due process
and equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions.
North Dakota's open court provision has no counterpart in the
federal constitution and, therefore, it must derive its scope and
reasoning from state case law. 88 The ultimate question to be
addressed in North Dakota is whether the legislature or courts will
supply content to North Dakota's open court provision. The North
Dakota Supreme Court, most cognizant of the separation of powers
doctrine, 89 traditionally has been deferential in its review of
legislative action.90 In interpreting the scope of article I, section 9,
the court will be defining the parameters of permissible judicial
review of our state constitution. While reading the prohibitions of
the open court provision too literally might effectively preclude
83. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d at 573.
84. Id. at 574.
85. Id. The exact language utilized in Overland was interesting because it seemed to assent to a
suspect classification analysis under the federal equal protection clause. See id. at 574. Compare
Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d at 574 ("In any event, these problems are not unique
to the construction industry, and they are not sufficiently compelling to justify the enactment of
legislation which, without providing an alternative means of redress, totally abolishes an injured
person's cause of action.") with State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627 (N.D. 1977) (to
survive a constitutional attack under the strict scrutiny test, a statute must be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest).
86. 369 So. 2d at 575. See Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 225 (Ky. 1973) (limitation statutes
that destroy a constitutionally protected right of action before the right exists are not permissible).
87. 369 So. 2d at 575.
88. See N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
89. See R.B.J. Apartments, Inc. v. Gate City Say. & Loan Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 284, 289 (N.D.
1982). In R.B.J. Apartments the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "Our constitutional obligations
prevent us from providing a cause of action significantly broader than the remedy Congress intended
to provide." Id.
90. See id.
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legislative action in areas of legitimate public concern; too broad a
reading would undoubtedly eviscerate the very rights the
constitutional provision was intended to protect. 91
The court must be mindful, however, that article I, section 9 is
a specific limitation upon the powers of the North Dakota
Legislature. In adjudging section 28-01.1-02 to be
unconstitutional, the North Dakota Supreme Court would not be
passing judgment upon the legislature's wisdom or lack thereof;
rather, the court would be following its own supreme mandate,
which is to uphold the Constitution of the State of North Dakota. 92
B. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution states
that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. 93 "Due process of law" is that process
which secures the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
governmental powers. 94 Although this Article analyzes North
Dakota Century Code section 28-01.1-02 in light of state
constitutional law, the federal due process clause 95 must briefly be
mentioned to accentuate the sometimes differing standards of the
state and federal constitutions. Historically, the federal constitution
has protected both procedural and substantive due process rights.
Substantive due process outlines the constitutional limits on the
content of legislative action. 96 Procedural due process defines the
constitutional limits on judicial, executive, and administrative
enforcement of legislative actions. 97
Because section 28-01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code
affects substantive rather than procedural due process rights, the
91. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 351 (Ala. 1980) (Shores, J.,
concurring).
92. See id. at 353.
93. N.D. CONsr. art. I, § 12.
94. State ex. rel Miller v. Taylor, 27 N.D. 77, 90, 145 N.W.2d 425, 430 (1913) (citing
Columbia Bank v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819)).
95. The due process clause of the fifth amendment serves as a limitation on federal power. The
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment serves as a limitation on state power. See U.S.
CONsr. amends: V, XIV.
96. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONs-rITUTONAL LAW 502 n.4 (1978). In striking down legislation
on economic substantive due process grounds, the United States Supreme Court substituted its
judgment for that of Congress and state legislatures on the wisdom of economic regulation interfering
with contract and property interests. Id. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (United
States Supreme Court invalidated a state law setting a maximum 60-hour work week and 10-hour
workday for bakers).
97. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908) (due process clause prohibits procedures
which abridge any "fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very ideal of
free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government").
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statute must be analyzed accordingly.9 8  Section 28-01.1-02
probably does not violate the due process clause of the United
States Constitution. When a cause of action accrues, it becomes the
property of the injured party and its subsequent destruction is
subject to the due process clause of the United States
Constitution.99 There is no federal constitutional rule, however,
that prohibits a legislature from abolishing a cause of action before
it accrues. 100 Section 28-01.1-02 effectively bars a cause of action
before it accrues if the cause of action is based upon an injury
caused by a product that is ten or eleven years old. Therefore,
section 28-01.1-02 does not violate the due process clauses
contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
However, standards of constitutionality under federal and
state constitutions may differ. 101 Notwithstanding the decline of its
federal counterpart, substantive due process is still recognized as a
viable constitutional standard in North Dakota. 10 2 The North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, tempers such recognition with a
reluctance to strike down a statute solely on the basis of a
substantive due process violation. 103
The standard of scrutiny applicable to a substantive due
process analysis under the North Dakota Constitution is the close
correspondence test. 10 4 Under this test, the court requires a close
correspondence between the statutory classification and its
legislative goals.' 05 In addition, the court independently examines
the legislative justification of the statute. 106
98. Although economic substantive due process was repudiated by the United States Supreme
Court in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934), in which the Court upheld a New York
statute setting a minimum price for milk, recent decisions have recognized constitutionally protected
substantive due process rights. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (upholding a
Georgia statute allowing the adoption of an illegitimate child with only the mother's consent when
the natural father had not legitimized the child); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
501 (1977) (striking down a housing ordinance that limited occupancy to single families); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (protecting the constitutional right of a mother to procure an
abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973)
(striking down a Georgia statute that unduly restricted a woman's right to an abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965) (protecting right of people to purchase contraceptives).
99. Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 426 (1930) (right of recovery is a property right
protected by the due process clause). But see Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).
Although a vested cause of action is a property right protected by the due process clause, there is no
constitutional guarantee to a particular form of remedy. Id. Rather, the due process clause
guarantees the preservation of a substantive right to redress by some effective procedure. Id.
100. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978).
101. SeeJohnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 776 (N.D. 1974).
102. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978).
103. See id. at 131-38. The Arneson court found the Medical Malpractice Act to be in violation of
the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the constitutional prohibition against special
legislation. Id.
104.Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974).
105. SeeArneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
106. Id.
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The declaration of legislative findings and intent for the
Products Liability Act provides:
It is the purpose of sections 28-01.1-01 through 28-01.1
-05 to provide a reasonable time within which actions
may be commenced against manufacturers, while
limiting the time to a specific period for which products
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and
accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims. 107
The legislature sought to achieve these goals by completely barring
certain products liability actions if the product caused no injury for
ten years from the date of purchase or eleven years from the date of
manufacture. 108 Obviously, the legislature determined that barring
such claims would result in lower insurance rates.109 However, only
2.8 percent of all bodily injury claims and 0.7 percent of all
property damage claims are based upon products manufactured
more than ten years before the injury. 110 The few potential claims
that will be barred in North Dakota will have little or no impact on
insurance rates.
Products liability insurance rates are set on a national rather
than on a statewide basis. 1 ' Insurers utilize nationwide statistics to
set rates because a product manufactured in one state can readily
cause injury in any state. 112 In other words, there is little an
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-01(3) (Supp. 1981). In addition, the North Dakota Legislature
provided:
1. The legislative assembly finds that the number of lawsuits and claims for damages
and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from defective products has
substantially increased in recent years. Because of these increases, the insurance
industry has drastically increased the cost of products liability insurance. The effect of
increased insurance premiums and increased claims has increased product cost
through manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers passing the cost of premiums to the
consumer. Certain product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide
and manufacture certain products because of the high cost and possible unavailability
of products liability insurance.
2. Because of these recent trends, and for the purpose of alleviating the adverse effects
which these trends are producing in the manufacturing industry, it is necessary to
protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private
insurance companies to continue to provide products liability insurance.
Id. §28-01.1-01(1), (2).
108. See id. 5 28-01.1-02 (Interim Supp. 1983).
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for the declaration of legislative findings and
intent of§ 28-01. 1-01.
110. INSURANCE SERVS. OFFI., PRODUCr LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81 (1977).
111. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979) (recommended
draft of United States Department of Commerce).
112. Id.
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individual state can do to affect the problem of high products
liability insurance rates. Therefore, the requisite close
correspondence between this legislative enactment and its
legislative goals is probably lacking and the statute probably
violates article I, section 12; the due process clause of the North
Dakota Constitution.
C. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Virtually no law applies universally and affects all people
equally; all laws tend to classify or discriminate by imposing special
burdens or by conferring special benefits to some people and not to
others.113 Neither classification nor discrimination per se violates
the constitutional mandates of equal protection.11 4 A classification
violates the equal protection clause only if an insufficient nexus
exists between the means of classification and the governmental
objectives.1 15 The determination of what nexus is sufficient depends
upon the interest or classification involved.
If the statute creates a suspect classification '1 6 or infringes
upon a fundamental interest'1 7 the statute is subjected to the
strictest scrutiny.' 1 8 Should the court determine North Dakota's
open court provision protects a fundamental interest, the statute
will be subject to the strict scrutiny analysis. The statute must
promote a compelling government interest and be necessary to
achieve the legislative purpose to survive this strict scrutiny
analysis."19 The right of a person to seek redress for his personal
113. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, &J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1245 (1980).
114. See, e.g., State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 109 (N.D. 1980) (legislative classification
itself is not prohibited); State v. Allred, 254 N.W.2d 701, 703 (N.D. 1977) ("discrimination in itself
does not constitute a violation of equal protection").
115. See L. TRIBE, supra note 96 at 995. There must be a finding of rationality governing the
relation between means and ends. Id. See also Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
116. See supra note 57 for a definition of suspect classification. It appears that the United States
Supreme Court now relies upon three criteria in making a determination that a classification is
suspect: (1) whether the class has "a history of purposeful unequal treatment." San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); (2) whether the class has been "relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." Id.; (3) whether "the class is generally denied legal benefits on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).
117. For a comparision of fundamental interests protected by the equal protection clause and old
substantive due process, see Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969). In Shapiro the Court recognized the right to travel as a fundamental right under the
Constitution and disallowed any state infringement upon that right absent a showing that the
legislation was necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Id.
118. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978); Johnson v. Hasset, 217 N.W.2d
771, 775 (N.D. 1974). See generally Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 981 (1979) (discussion of the equal protection standards of review).
119. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 133. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 96 at 1000 ("the idea of
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injuries should be considered fundamental. The United States
Supreme Court has referred to the right of redress in court as "one
of the most fundamental requisites" of the fourteenth
amendment. 1 20 Should the North Dakota Supreme Court hold that
the right of access to courts is fundamental, section 28-01.1-02 most
probably would violate the equal protection clauses of the state and
federal constitutions.
Because the right of access to the courts is constitutionally
protected, this right should receive more than the minimum
rational relationship analysis. 121 Therefore, if the court fails to
recognize the right of access as fundamental, the middle level of
state constitutional scrutiny should be employed. 122 Under this
close correspondence test, the court would find the statutory
classifications constitutionally permissible only if there is a close
correspondence between the statutory classification and the
legislative goals. 123 Under this middle level of equal protection
review, the court independently examines the legislative
justifications for section 28-01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 124
Section 28-01.1-02 arguably has several impermissible and
unjustifiable classifications. It offers protection to those consumers
injured by new products, but not to those injured by older
products. It offers protection to manufacturers and suppliers of
older products, but not to those who manufacture and supply new
products. Legislative classifications such as these, however, are not
strict scrutiny acknowledges that other political choices - those burdening fundamental rights, or
suggesting prejudice against racial or other minorities - must be subjected to close analysis in order
to preserve substantive values of equality and liberty").
120. Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962). A state may generally set
reasonable terms upon which it will permit litigation in its courts. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949). Unreasonable restraints amounting to complete prohibitions
before a cause of action accrues, however, may be unconstitutional. See Chicago & Northwestern
R.R. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 44 (1922). Unreasonable restraints are those which
are so 'arbitrary, unequal and oppressive [that they] 'shock' the sense of fairness the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to satisfy." Id. at 45.
121. See, e.g., Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 514 (1982) (intermediate review used in
challenge to state sovereign immunity); Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1979)
(intermediate review used in challenge to statute requiring 90-day notice requirement for bringing an
action against a municipality); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (intermediate
review used in reviewing Medical Malpractice Act); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775
(N.D. 1974) (intermediate review used in suit challenging constitutionality of automobile guest
statute).
122. Compare Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1979) (when the right of
action has not been created by the legislature and the legislature seeks to limit the right of an injured
person to bring an action against a tort-feasor, then the intermediate level ofjudicial scrutiny should
be applied) with Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39, 47 (N.D. 1974) (when
the legislature creates the plaintiff's right of action, it may also constitutionally impose reasonable
limits on the right to bring that action).
123. For a discussion of the close correspondence test, see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying
text.
124. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
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impermissible per se. 125 The legislature has the power to make
some distinctions based upon classification. 126 Only when this
power is exercised in an arbitrary and unnatural manner is the
equal protection clause violated. 1
27
The legislative purpose behind the enactment of section 28
-01.1-02 was to reduce the cost and to ensure the availability of
products liability insurance. 128 As discussed earlier, however,
section 28-01.1-02 will have little or no effect on the cost or
availability of products liability insurance. 129 The number of claims
in North Dakota based upon products ten or eleven years old would
have an insignificant effect on any determination of products
liability insurance rates. Yet, the effect of this statute on a person
injured by a ten or eleven year old product could be catastrophic.
Thus, the requisite close correspondence does not exist between the
classifications drawn by section 28-01.1-02 and its legislative goal
of reducing products liability insurance premiums. 130
D. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME
COURT
Article VI, section 3 of the North Dakota Constitution states,
"The Supreme Court shall have authority to promulgate rules of
procedure .... ,,131 This constitutional provision mandates that the
125. See State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 109 (N.D. 1980). The Carpenter court stated that
although legislative classifications themselves are not prohibited, the legislature may not act
arbitrarily in classifying to achieve social goals. Id.
126. See State ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Fund v. E. W. Wylie Co., 79 N.D. 471, 479. 58
N.W.2d 76, 84 (1953). The court stated:
As long as the law operates alike on all members of a class including all persons
similarly situated it is not in violation of those sections .... The state may classify
persons and objects for the purpose oflegislation if the classification is based on proper
and justifiable distinction considering the purpose of the law.
Id.
127. See Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 99 (N.D.
1979). In Benson the court applied the intermediate level of review in determining whether the
exclusion of agricultural employees from workmen's compensation coverage violated the right to
equal protection of the law. Id. In this instance, however, the court was faced not with a limitation on
actions for common law tort remedies, but rather with the complete exclusion of a legislatively
created remedy to one class of employee. Id. at 98.
128. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-01 (Supp. 1981). See Supra note 107 fbr the text of § 28
-01.1-01.
129. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of §§ 28-01.1
-01 to -05 on product liability insurance.
130. This Article will not analyze section 28-01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code under
the most deferential equal protection review, the rational relationship test. If the North Dakota
Supreme Court follows precedent, its minimum review under the state equal protection provisions
will be the "close correspondence" test. See, e.g., Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D.
1982) (intermediate standard of review applied to classification of tort victims of insured agencies and
those ofuninsured agencies).
131. N.D. CONST. art. VI, §3.
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supreme court shall have the ultimate authority to promulgate the
rules of procedure used in North Dakota courts. 132 This provision,
however, does not displace any legislative effort to define the time
limitations on the right to bring suit. The provision merely
reinforces the constitutional authority of the supreme court to
define the manner and mode of enforcing a claimant's right of
action. This provision does not empower the supreme court to
recognize or allow a cause of action where none exists. 133
In Arneson v. Olson134 the court implicitly recognized the right
of the legislature to limit or eliminate a pre-existing right if the
action was not arbitrarily imposed. 135 More specifically, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has stated that the legislature may lessen
the statutory period for existing causes of action if the claimant has
a reasonable time in which to sue. 136 Because the effect of section
28-01.1-02 is more substantive than procedural, its enactment
probably does not violate article VI, section 3 of the North Dakota
Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
North Dakota is primarily an agricultural state. We have little
or no industrial base and are dependent upon goods manufactured
outside of the state to supply our basic needs. Since the turn of the
century farming has evolved into a highly mechanized industry.
Modern farm machinery is large, powerful, and, if defectively
manufactured, extremely dangerous. Farming is one of the most
dangerous occupations in the country today. 137
In 1983 the farm economy is in a depressed financial state.
Farmers may be unable, therefore, to replace older equipment with
more modern equipment. As. long as the farm economy remains
depressed, the average age of the farm equipment on North Dakota
132. See id. The term procedure means pleading and evidentiary matters. See 72 C.J.S. Practice
471 (1951).
133. See N.D. CONsr. art. VI, § 3. However, pursuant to its constitutional right of judicial
review, the supreme court has the power to declare legislation unconstitutional under other
constitutional provisions. See N.D. CONsr. art. VI, § 4.
134. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
135. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978).
136. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Braithwaite, 7 N.D. 358, 362, 75 N.W. 244, 248 (1898).
137. 1 H. PHiLO, LAWYER'S DEsK REFERENCE § 10.1, at 653 (Law. Co-op. 6th ed. 1979). There
are approximately 6400 deaths and 570,000 disabling injuries each year on farms. Id. The death rate
per 100,000 farm residents in 1972 was 66.6, with machinery being involved in two out of five
accidental farm deaths. Id. at 653-54. This death rate is three times the percentage of deaths
occurring on the job in industry. Id. at 654.
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farms will increase. 13 8 It is intolerable that in years to come -North
Dakotans may receive injuries for which the legislature has denied
them adequate redress.
138. See H. Doss, Nature and Extent of Farm Machinery Use in Relation to Frequency of
Accidents in Michigan and Ohio (1973) (unpublished MS Thesis, Dep't of Agric. Engineering,
Michigan State University) (over 50% ofall tractors have a life span of more than 10 years).
